How much oil-market buffer is left?

The Depletion Ledger

Oil is part of everyday life, even when you don't think about it. It's refined into fuels that power cars, move goods, and help farmers grow our food. It's also used to make things like the clothes we wear.

Since the US and Israel went to war with Iran in February 2026, the world has been using more oil than it produces. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are effectively closed to oil shipping, cutting off roughly 20% of the world's oil supply. Russian refinery strikes and export bans are making the situation worse. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since 1982.

The Depletion Ledger tracks oil supplies, fuel prices, and how the shortage affects people and businesses. You can use the charts below to see what's changed and explore three ways the crisis could unfold. The model estimates how long stored oil could last in each case, and keeps a record of its predictions so you can see how they hold up.

Last updated Sep 16, 2026

Brent

$105.83

Sep 16 settlement · −2.7% · +39% vs pre-crisis ~$76

US diesel (AAA)

$6.31

Sep 16 · all-time record $6.3103 · seventh day in a row · +70% vs pre-war $3.72

US gasoline (AAA)

$4.37

Sep 16 · +14¢ in a week (AAA) · +55% vs Jan $2.81

SPR

285.0M

Sep 11 · down 0.4M in a week · down 130.5M from pre-war 415.4M · lowest since Nov 1982

US diesel & heating oil

107.9M

Sep 11 · up 1.6M in a week · 13.5% below last year · East Coast stocks 31% below last year

Prices

These charts show how oil, gasoline, diesel, and natural gas prices have changed. Brent is a widely used benchmark for the price of crude oil. The gasoline and diesel charts use US national averages; the natural gas charts cover Europe and Asia. Every plotted value comes from a source. Missing readings are left out.

US gasoline prices are up 55%

EIA weekly, national

The national average has risen from $2.81 in January to $4.37, an increase of about 55%. Prices peaked at $4.50 in May. Every month since March has averaged above the levels seen before the crisis.

US diesel prices are up 70%

AAA national, sourced points

Diesel cost $3.72 in the last week before the war, on Feb 27. By Sep 16, it had reached $6.31, about 70% higher and its seventh record in a row. It passed the previous record of about $5.85, set in June 2022, on Sep 4. Both charts show selected readings. The price spread chart below includes daily observations from Sep 3 to Sep 16. Diesel prices have risen faster than gasoline prices as supplies of refined fuel have tightened.

Natural gas prices in Europe are up about 153%

TTF, $/MMBtu · filled: EIA weekly futures avgs (Jan–Apr) · hollow: individual contract quotes (May–Sep) · different instruments — a trend, not one series

TTF is the benchmark used to track natural gas prices in Europe. It traded above $28 on Sep 10, eased to $27.00 on Sep 11, and stood at about $27.80 on Sep 14 — the highest levels since December 2022. That's roughly 153% above the price before the strait closed. The Sep 14 value is converted from €81.98 per megawatt-hour to the dollar units used in this chart. Prices have risen as unplanned maintenance at Norway's Asgard and Troll fields and tanker attacks put pressure on supplies.

By January 20, European gas storage had fallen to 48%, compared with a five-year average of 63%. Running that low left Europe buying liquefied natural gas (LNG) for immediate delivery during the season the strait closed.

Natural gas prices in Asia are up about 167%

JKM, $/MMBtu · filled: EIA weekly futures avgs (Jan–Apr) · hollow: assessed spot (May–Sep) · different instruments — a trend, not one series

JKM tracks the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to Asia. It reached the high-$28s on Sep 10 — its highest level in roughly two and a half years — and held around $28.50 on Sep 11, about 167% above the price before the closure (JOGMEC). Damaged production units at Qatar's Ras Laffan complex — about 17% of the country's LNG export capacity — are expected to be offline for 3–5 years, forcing Asian buyers to look elsewhere for supplies. With little gas in storage, the region is particularly sensitive to changes in supply and weather.

Brent and WTI prices are up about 39% and 53%

Brent: sourced points (EIA monthly avgs: Mar $103.0 · Apr $117.29 · Jul $83.76) · WTI: weekly (FRED)

Brent rose from $76 before the closure to an intraday peak of $126 in March, then fell to $95 by mid-April and $74 on Jun 30 as hopes for a ceasefire grew. It passed $100 again on Sep 9 as tanker attacks escalated, rose $6.82 to $108.03 on Sep 10, and settled at $104.61 on Sep 11.

Brent settled at $105.83 on Sep 16, down 2.7% from the previous close, and WTI closed at $102.43, down 3.2%. Prices fell as the US energy secretary called the East–West pipeline outage "brief and temporary," measured "in days." Officials and independent analysts point to weeks; the kingdom has not published a damage assessment or a repair schedule.

Before the shutdown, the pipeline carried about 4 million barrels a day to Yanbu, Saudi Arabia's Red Sea port, according to Reuters. Stored oil there was estimated to cover five to seven days of exports. Reuters now reports that shipments from the port have stopped and that late-September cargoes to Europe have been cancelled.

The yield on 10-year US Treasury bonds ended the day at 5.006%, closing above 5% for the first time since the war began. On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, to 3.75–4.00%. As of Sep 11, futures markets had put the chance of an increase at roughly 86%.

The gray line shows West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a US crude oil benchmark. Most WTI readings come from FRED's weekly spot series; the Sep 10, 11, 14, 15, and 16 readings are futures closes. WTI is also the crude price used in the fuel price spread chart beside this one. Hollow markers indicate a source's rounded estimate.

The diesel price spread is up about 80%

Retail price less WTI, $/bbl · weekly (EIA/AAA − FRED).

This chart subtracts the price of crude oil from the retail price of fuel, with both expressed in dollars per barrel. The difference covers refining, transportation, and retailing. It helps explain why prices at the pump can keep rising even when crude gets cheaper.

Diesel's spread was about $89 in January. It briefly narrowed to $148 on Sep 10, when crude prices rose faster than pump prices. It peaked at $160.3 on Sep 14, fell to $157.5 on Sep 15, and rose to a new high of $162.6 on Sep 16. That day, crude prices fell about 3% while the diesel pump price set another record. Gasoline's spread has also widened, from about $59 to $81.0.

The calculation uses retail prices from EIA and AAA, minus WTI from FRED, with futures closes for Sep 10, 11, 14, 15, and 16. The EIA's official crack spread uses wholesale fuel prices, so the values differ. Six of the plotted fuel readings have no same-day WTI price. For those readings, the chart uses the nearest trading day's price, within 1–2 days. No missing prices are estimated.

Supply

When the world uses more oil than it produces, the difference comes out of storage. These charts show how much oil has been withdrawn, how much is left, and how long the US emergency reserve could last under each of the model's three scenarios.

The world is using more oil than it produces

Before the war, the world produced about 4 million more barrels of oil per day than it used. Since the war began, it has had to draw on stored oil every month. The IEA's latest report estimates a full-year supply loss of 5.7 million barrels per day, about 6% of the world's oil, and expects Middle East oil flows to remain below normal until 2027. Global production fell to 100.1 million barrels per day in August, with more than 10 million barrels per day of Gulf production still shut down. Saudi production alone fell by 2.3 million barrels per day that month, to 5.97 million.

World oil balance, million b/d — production minus consumption, EIA STEO Table 3a, reported months (Jan–Aug actuals; the EIA's forecast tail is not shown) · the physical loss peaked at 11.2M b/d of Gulf shut-in in May — demand destruction and non-Gulf supply absorbed most of it · the IEA's observed-inventories count: 507 mb drawn since February — 2.8 mb/d on average, 95 mb of it in August alone.

How much stored oil has been used

Withdrawals and changes in demand, using figures available as of Sep 11.

Global commercial stocks

−400M bbl

year-to-date · EIA est. (Sep 9)

US Strategic Petroleum Reserve

−129M bbl

since Feb 28 · EIA

IEA coordinated release

400M bbl

pulled from 32 countries · IEA

China commercial stockpiles

~2–3M b/d

withdrawals inferred from customs data · official SPR untouched

Decline in oil demand

−2.5M b/d

full-year 2026, cut from −1.6 in the August edition · IEA OMR, Sep 11

Remaining supply shortfall

−1.8M b/d

Q3 2026 forecast — supply below demand · IEA OMR, Aug 12

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level in 44 years

EIA weekly ending stocks, million bbl

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is the US government's emergency supply of crude oil. It was created after the energy shortages of the 1970s. The reserve held 415.4 million barrels when the war began. The latest report, for the week ending Sep 11, puts it at 285.0 million, down 0.4 million barrels in a week. Withdrawals slowed for a third straight week, from 1.2 million the week before and 3.1 million the week before that. Oil is being released to help make up for supplies that can't leave the Gulf. You can use the withdrawal rate to see how quickly the emergency supply is being used.

SPR withdrawals could pause even if the crisis continues

The Department of Energy releases oil from the SPR through contracts and scheduled deliveries. A supply shortage doesn't automatically trigger withdrawals. The dashed lines start at the Sep 11 level and assume withdrawals continue at 0.45M, 0.70M, or 1.35M barrels a day. The latest reported week averaged about 60,000 barrels a day. The shipping odds don't tell you how likely the reserve is to reach the projected levels by those dates.

The red lines mark the model's reserve thresholds, or floors. At about 300M barrels, some caverns risk damage and can't safely be refilled after a withdrawal. The first report below that threshold was for the week ending Aug 7, at 298.7 million barrels.

In its Sep 16 report, the EIA said commercial crude stocks fell 0.6 million barrels. The American Petroleum Institute (API) had reported an increase for that week. Diesel stocks rose for a second straight week, to 107.9 million barrels, but East Coast stocks are still 31% below last year.

The other floors are 250M, the GEF minimum for sustained withdrawals; 180M, the hard operating limit; and 70M, the Department of Energy's stated safe minimum. The model stops withdrawals at 70M.

Weekly withdrawals fell from 3.1 million to 1.2 million, then to 0.4 million barrels in the week ending Sep 11. Diesel stocks rose for a second straight week, up 1.6 million barrels, according to the EIA's Sep 16 report.

Three possible outcomes

Estimated shipping odds, updated when specified events occur.

These odds describe what could happen to shipping. Each reserve path assumes a steady withdrawal rate, which depends on government releases and deliveries continuing.

Oil loadings at Yanbu, the pipeline's export port, stopped while the pipeline remained shut. Oil could no longer leave through the Saudi bypass. In Libya, guards shut the Hamada–Zawiya pipeline, halting two oil fields.

The Saudi bypass pipeline was suspended, and the Houthis held the entire Red Sea coast. An official pipeline restart would return the odds to 10/50/40.

Tanker losses reached 10 per week, Brent passed $100, and Jazan was affected.

A shipping exclusion zone was imposed, and a base in a third country was hit for the first time.

Reported Hormuz traffic of 8.6M barrels per day was not backed by vessel tracking, which showed 7% of normal transits.

Initial model: about 65% odds of de-escalation.

Corridor holds

10%

Tankers can pass through Hormuz under an Iran–Oman agreement or with US escorts. Traffic gradually returns to normal over one to two quarters.

In this scenario, Brent moves toward $70–80. The reserve path assumes withdrawals of 0.45M barrels per day, so stored oil lasts longer if releases continue at that rate.

Standoff

35%

The war continues at its current intensity. Tanker attacks and shipping restrictions persist, some Iranian infrastructure remains offline, and the damaged Saudi bypass has no restart date. The strait remains partly open.

Brent stays in the $95–125 range. The reserve path assumes continuing withdrawals of 0.70M barrels per day. Global stocks keep falling, with shortages developing later.

Corridor lapses

55%

The disruption becomes a sustained closure or the fighting escalates. Tanker losses rise, shipping restrictions remain, and the bypass, Abqaiq, and Jazan stay offline for months.

Brent rises above $130. The reserve path assumes continuing withdrawals of 1.35M barrels per day. Shortages spread from the US East Coast to Russia, Europe, China, and aviation fuel.

These odds are based on judgment. They change when specified events occur, such as a pipeline restarting or a shipping agreement breaking down. A quiet week alone doesn't change them. You can read the rules and the events being watched on the model page.

The stockpile, in context

This chart puts the current reserve in perspective. It held 727 million barrels at its December 2009 peak and 270.5 million at the previous low in August 1982. It held 285.0 million on Sep 11. The green line marks the level before the war. In the model, withdrawals stop at the 70 million barrel floor.

Supply snapshot

Large withdrawals began on Apr 3, when the reserve held 413.3 million barrels. They reached about 1.2 million barrels per day in May. In the week ending Sep 11, withdrawals totaled about 0.4 million barrels, or roughly 60,000 a day. Weekly withdrawals slowed for a third straight week, from 3.1M to 1.2M to 0.4M barrels. The daily rate is far below the 0.45 million barrels assumed in the corridor-holds scenario.

US diesel and heating-oil stocks were 13.5% below a year earlier on Sep 11, according to the EIA.

SPR

285.0M bbl

−130.5M (−31%) since pre-war 415.4M

Lowest since Nov 1982 · down 0.4M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — third straight week of slowing withdrawals

US diesel & heating oil

107.9M bbl

Up 1.6M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — the second weekly increase in a row; 13.5% below last year (EIA)

East Coast (PADD 1) stocks are 31% below last year

US crude

423.4M bbl

Down 0.6M barrels in the week ending Sep 11 — EIA reported a decrease, while the American Petroleum Institute (API) had reported an increase

Refined fuels remain in shorter supply than crude oil

Global inventories

−400M bbl YTD

EIA estimate, Sep 9

falling through end of 2026

How quickly the reserve is shrinking

The latest withdrawal rate and estimated dates for reaching the reserve thresholds, using the EIA's Sep 16 report for the week ending Sep 11.

SPR withdrawal rate

0.3million barrels/day

4-week average, EIA weekly report (week ending Sep 11) · latest single week: 0.06.

Weekly withdrawals: about 9.1M barrels at the mid-June peak (week ending Jun 19), falling to 0.4M by Sep 11. The earlier 9.9M peak in the week ending May 15 falls outside this 16-week chart.

250M barrels if withdrawals average 1.35M a day

≈ Oct 72026

This date assumes continuing releases. Withdrawals could pause.

Starting from the reported 285.0M barrels on Sep 11, the corridor-lapse path uses 1.35M barrels a day. At the standoff path's assumed 0.70M a day, the same threshold would be reached on Oct 31.

At those same assumed rates, 180M barrels would be reached around Nov 28, 2026(1.35M a day) or Feb 8, 2027 (0.70M a day).

Refining

Crude oil has to be refined before it can be used as diesel, gasoline, or jet fuel. That makes refinery capacity just as important as the amount of oil available. US refineries are processing more oil than last year, while processing has fallen elsewhere and strikes continue to damage Russian refineries. The IEA describes the global refining system as “stretched to the limit.” Atlantic Basin refining margins reached records in August, led by diesel.

US refineries have run above 95% of capacity since June

Utilization, % of operable capacity, weekly.

US refineries have operated above 95% of their available capacity every week since Jun 5, reaching 98.0% in the week ending Aug 28 and easing to 96.8% in the week ending Sep 11. Across the January–September weeks shown, utilization averaged 90.7% in 2025 and 93.6% in 2026. Fuel exports also reached a record 8 million barrels per day in August, according to OPEC. US plants are working close to capacity, but shortages in Europe, Asia, and Russia continue to put pressure on fuel supplies.

EIA Weekly Petroleum Status Report (WPULEUS3), week ending Friday · utilization = gross inputs ÷ latest reported operable capacity (EIA's definition) · 2025 line = same Jan–Sep window · in mb/d: runs 16.3–17.3 (STEO 4a), above 2025 in every month · see the fuel price spread chart in Prices for the effect on costs.

Global refining

Refineries elsewhere are processing less oil. These figures from the IEA's August and September reports show the size of the decline.

Global refining, August

81.4 mb/d

summer peak, −4.2 mb/d below a year ago (OMR, Sep 11)

Refining forecast, 2026

−2.6 mb/d

IEA forecast vs 2025 (OMR, Sep 11)

Q3 forecast revision

−370 kb/d

the quarter's further cut (OMR, Aug 12)

Estimates put Russia's lost refining capacity at 20–54%

estimated capacity remaining, % of pre-strike

Strikes on Russian refineries are reducing the amount of fuel available to other countries. The chart shows about 75% of capacity remaining by mid-April and about 70% by Aug 29, according to the Moscow Times. The red bar shows how much current estimates differ: Ukraine's General Staff puts the capacity lost at 42.74%, Russian Forbes at 54%, and the IEA at more than 20%. You can compare these estimates with the reported outages and export restrictions below.

Russia snapshot

capacity offline

>30%

Aug 29, Moscow Times — up from ~25% in April

Early September estimates of capacity offline: 42.7% (Ukraine's General Staff) to 54% (Forbes)

strikes in August

21+

record month, near-daily (Bloomberg, Aug 29)

Kirishi — Russia's #2 plant

halted

~400K b/d, its only NW plant, two strikes in a month (UA.NEWS, Sep 2)

Ryazan (Rosneft) — Moscow's main supplier

down

~156K barrels/day; both primary units offline since Sep 6, with repairs expected to take several weeks (Reuters, Sep 10)

Perm capacity

−86%

primary capacity, satellite imagery (Bloomberg, Aug 25)

every major Lukoil refinery is offline

Novorossiysk — main Black Sea port

hit

fuel-oil terminal + the city, 4 killed (Sep 8–9)

crude outflow 800 → 350 kb/d, Jul → Aug — all three export directions now under attack

stations rationed

28%

nationwide caps; Moscow 90% out of AI-92 (Euronews, Aug 20)

gasoline contracts unmet

>50%

TASS, Sep 3

oil & gas revenue

−45.4%

YoY, Q1 official

Lost production is also reducing government revenue

The export ban calendar

Russia's export restrictions leave less fuel available to other countries during the heating season. Sep 30 is the next deadline for the diesel export ban, and the jet-fuel export ban is scheduled to take effect on Nov 30. Damaged refineries also leave Russia with less fuel for its own gas stations and military as winter approaches.

Sep 30, 2026

diesel exports

Nov 30, 2026

jet fuel exports

Jan 31, 2027

gasoline & the remaining diesel

Imports aren't making up the difference. Fuel shipments on the Belarus rail route are running at 25 times last year's volume. The shortage also affects countries that rely on Russian fuel: Kyrgyzstan imports more than 90% of its gasoline from Russia and has about six weeks of reserves left.

Effects on the economy

Higher energy costs affect more than your fuel bill. They can slow business activity, keep inflation high, and eventually make food more expensive. People and businesses also use less oil when they can no longer afford it. Economists call this demand destruction. The charts below show that decline alongside recession estimates, interest rates, and the possible effects on food prices.

World oil use fell about 4% in May compared with last year

World petroleum & liquid fuels consumption, mb/d · monthly (EIA STEO, Sep 9 release) · Jan – Aug, 2026 vs 2025.

World oil use fell 4.3 million barrels per day below last year's level in May, a decline of about 4%. The gap narrowed to 3.6 million in July and 0.8 million in August. Using less oil helps contain prices, but it also reflects the strain on the economy. The IEA now expects demand to fall by 2.5 million barrels per day across 2026, compared with its August estimate of 1.6 million. It expects the quarterly decline to ease from 5.3 million in Q2 to 3.4 million in Q3 and 2.0 million in Q4, followed by a 2.6 million barrel per day recovery in 2027. The losses are concentrated in fuels such as diesel and in raw materials used to make chemicals, especially in Asia. These estimates aren't universally agreed on. OPEC expects demand to grow by 0.4 million barrels per day in 2026, a difference of 2.9 million between the two forecasts.

EIA STEO Table 3e (Sep 9 2026, forecast completed Sep 3) · Jan–Aug 2026 are actuals in that release · world/regional values are EIA estimates (apparent consumption, incl. refinery fuel & bunkering) · Sep 2026 onward is forecast, not shown.

Where oil use fell in July

Million b/d, July 2026 vs July 2025 — same table.

World

−3.6

105.4 → 101.8 mb/d

Middle East

−1.2

10.2 → 8.9 mb/d

Asia & Oceania

−1.9

37.9 → 36.0 mb/d

China

−0.8

16.4 → 15.6 mb/d · part of Asia & Oceania; using stockpiles to support consumption

Europe

−0.1

14.8 → 14.7 mb/d

United States

−0.4

21.0 → 20.5 mb/d

Estimates of US recession risk

These estimates, published between June and September 2026, put the chance of a US recession over the next 12 months at 15% to 50%. Goldman Sachs has kept its estimate at 15% since Jun 26, down from 30% in late March. It repeated that estimate on Sep 14. Polymarket puts the odds at 32%, but covers a longer period, through the end of 2027. Keep that difference in mind when comparing the figures.

The Fed raised rates on Sep 16

The Federal Reserve can cut interest rates to support a slowing economy, but persistent inflation makes that harder. August producer prices rose 5.4% from a year earlier. Consumer inflation held at 3.4%, with energy up 16.3%, while core inflation eased to 2.4%.

On Sep 16, the Fed voted 12-to-0 to raise rates by a quarter of a percentage point, citing elevated inflation. According to the Wall Street Journal, 16 of the 18 officials projected at least one more increase this year. Higher borrowing costs add to the pressure from rising energy prices.

Fed's target rate, Sep 16

3.75–4.00%

Up 0.25 percentage points in a 12-to-0 vote · statement: 'Inflation remains elevated. … The Committee will deliver price stability.'

Odds of a rate increase, Oct 27–28

60%

Our estimate, published Sep 16 · 16 of 18 Fed officials projected another increase this year · we'll score this prediction after the October decision

Aug PPI (BLS, Sep 10)

5.4% YoY

+0.4% for the month · July revised to 4.8% annually · energy +4.2%, diesel +24.1% annually · 10-year yield highest since Oct 2023

The European Central Bank says Germany and Italy could both be in a technical recession by the end of 2026 if the conflict continues.

Borrowing costs and inflation

You can see the wider effects in borrowing costs and everyday prices. Both are at multi-year highs. In its Sep 16 rate decision, the Fed cited elevated inflation and described the economy as growing at a solid pace.

US 10-year Treasury yield

10-year US Treasury yield, % · chart through Sep 16 · weekly closes (FRED) · Sep 11, 14, 15, and 16: Yahoo closing values.

The 10-year Treasury yield is the rate the US government pays to borrow for a decade. It also influences mortgage and business loan rates. It has risen by about one percentage point, or 100 basis points, since before the war. Inflation and concerns about government debt are both putting pressure on rates. The national debt exceeds $40 trillion, and $8.4 trillion of Treasuries must be refinanced by year-end.

The 10-year yield closed at 4.975% on Sep 11 after briefly reaching 4.992%, its highest level since October 2023. It eased to 4.961% on Sep 14, then closed at 4.996% on Sep 15, ahead of the Federal Reserve's 12-to-0 decision to raise rates. On Sep 16, it closed at 5.006%, its first close above 5% since the war began. Al Jazeera reported that it reached 5.02% during Sep 15 trading, its highest level since 2007.

The 2-year yield was 4.63% on Sep 11, its highest since July 2024. The market's measure of expected inflation over the next 10 years eased to 2.36%. That suggests investors are seeking higher returns after inflation, even as their inflation expectations have fallen.

US producer prices are rising faster than consumer prices

CPI (retail, amber) + PPI final demand (wholesale, blue) · % year-over-year · monthly (BLS) · Jan – Aug.

Consumer inflation rose from about 2.4% to 4.2% in three months as fuel became more expensive. It eased to 3.4% in July and stayed there in August. Prices rose 0.4% in August alone, with gasoline's 3.9% increase accounting for more than a third of that rise. Core inflation, which excludes food and energy, eased from 2.5% to 2.4% over the year, although its 0.3% monthly increase was above expectations. Producer prices rose faster, peaking at 5.9% in May and increasing 5.4% in August compared with a year earlier. July's reading was revised to 4.8%. Energy explains much of the increase, with diesel up 24.1%. These costs can reach businesses before they show up in household spending (BLS, Sep 10–11).

Higher energy costs can take more than a year to reach food prices

Natural gas is used to make ammonia, a key ingredient in nitrogen fertilizer. Higher gas and shipping costs can make food more expensive, but the effects may take more than a year to reach your grocery bill.

The timeline uses the 2007–08 and 2022 shocks to illustrate when those costs could reach food prices. It's a rough historical comparison, not a forecast from this model.

Gulf–India tanker freight

+411%

$4.34/bbl in Aug vs pre-war (Frontline)

TTF gas (Europe)

€82/MWh

Sep 14 · above $28/MMBtu Sep 10 (JOGMEC) · highest since Dec 2022

JKM gas (Asia)

$28.5/MMBtu

Sep 11 · high-$28s Sep 10 (JOGMEC) · highest in ~2.5 years

Higher energy prices can raise freight and fertilizer costs, affect planting and harvests, and eventually raise food prices. The bars show approximate windows based on the 2007–08 and 2022 shocks. Food prices could remain under pressure after oil reserves have reached the model's thresholds.

What to watch next

Upcoming reports and decisions that could change the outlook.

Any day

An official repair estimate for the East–West pipeline. AP reports 3–5 weeks; industry sources cited by Reuters estimate five to six weeks for full repairs; Saudi officials have told reporters 'multiple weeks,' but no official damage assessment or repair schedule has been published — and the US energy secretary has called the outage 'measured in days.' Reuters reported on Sep 15 that shipments from Yanbu, the port supplied by the pipeline, had stopped. Aramco has also cancelled or delayed shipments to Europe scheduled for late September.

The standoff scenario depends on this bypass. Rystad warns that prices could rise further if the disruption outlasts Yanbu's five to seven days of stored supplies. An official assessment that repairs will take only days would reverse the Sep 11 change in odds.

Any day

A new date for the Gulf–Iran talks in Salalah, postponed from Sep 14. Iran says Saudi Arabia requested the delay because of events in Yemen.

Resuming the talks could help restore tanker access through Hormuz.

Any day

Shipping conditions after the Houthis captured the Hanish islands on Sep 13–14. The Houthis claim 85 vessels passed through Bab el-Mandeb in 72 hours. Missile and drone attacks on Saudi cities wounded 13 civilians on Sep 13–14.

An attack on a non-Saudi vessel would raise the model's odds that the shipping corridor closes.

Any day

How banks respond to the Sep 14 sanctions on Russia's VTB; Treasury is meeting with financial institutions this week.

If banks stop handling VTB's payments, Iran loses channels for receiving oil revenue.

Any day

How many ships are passing through Hormuz. Kpler/Reuters counted 7 vessels on Sep 14 (revised up from a preliminary count of 4) and 4 on Sep 15 — two in, two out, none a crude carrier or LNG tanker. A US official told Axios that an average of 40 ships a day transit under US guidance, exporting roughly 14 million barrels a day. Ship-tracking data shows far fewer.

The official account and the tracking data give different pictures of shipping through Hormuz. A sustained drop below the current level would undercut the claimed volume.

Any day

A new round of the SPR exchange program. About 133.6 million barrels of the announced 172-million-barrel program were awarded across five rounds (March–June). The June round awarded only 500,000 barrels of the 40 million offered. Existing deliveries may be nearing completion, but their remaining volume and end date haven't been confirmed. Companies must return the borrowed crude plus additional barrels under their contracts.

New contracts and deliveries could increase withdrawals again. The amount awarded would show how much oil companies are willing to take under the offered terms.

Sep 23

The EIA's report for the week ending Sep 18 — the first that partially covers the shutdown of Yanbu loadings. The last report showed a third straight week of slower SPR withdrawals (0.4M barrels) and a second weekly increase in diesel stocks. It doesn't yet show the pipeline shutdown's full effect.

Watch for faster reserve withdrawals, a larger drop in commercial crude stocks, or falling diesel stocks. Those changes could show how the shutdown is affecting supplies. The Department of Energy could announce a change in withdrawals before the report.

Sep 30

Russia's diesel export ban expires unless extended; the US-led coalition completes its withdrawal from Iraq; prediction-market bets settle.

Several deadlines in one week, each with supply or price implications.

Oct 7

The EIA's first monthly outlook since the tanker attacks. Its oil price forecast of roughly $90 for the second half of the year is about $19 below Brent's latest closing price.

Watch whether the EIA still expects shipping to continue despite restrictions.

Nov 3

The US midterm elections — President Trump has said the war will end just after the elections.

Watch whether fighting and diplomacy match the administration's stated timeline.

Nov 30

Russia's jet-fuel export ban takes effect.

Aviation fuel supplies tighten further as the world's remaining stocks run low.

Where shortages could appear next

These are estimates of where shortages could become more severe if the crisis continues. The first two dates use published stock levels; the others are inferred from customs and inventory data. Allow for uncertainty of a week or two.

Sep 14–21

US East Coast — Diesel and heating-oil stocks could fall below a month of supply. They are already 31% lower than last year.

Sep 30

Russia — The diesel export ban expires. With more than 30% of refining capacity damaged, Russia may have little fuel available to export.

≈ mid-October

China — Commercial oil stocks could begin to fall faster than normal.

≈ late October

Europe's oil hubs — Rotterdam-area diesel stocks could fall below 8.5–9M barrels, a level that would put pressure on trading. If the strait closes fully, the estimate moves up to mid-October.

≈ late October

Europe, at the pump — Shortages could reach consumers, with price increases putting pressure on governments.

Nov 10–30

Air travel — Russia's jet-fuel export ban begins Nov 30. The world's remaining stocks amount to about 26 days of flying.

The estimates on this site depend on the assumptions in each scenario. Data comes from EIA reports, the IEA Oil Market Report, GEF, PortWatch/Kpler, CENTCOM statements, and news sources recorded in the daily research notes. Unverified reports stay in those notes until they can be checked. Hollow dots on the charts indicate a source's rounded estimate.

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